Linguistic Relativity And Its Relation To Analytic Philosophy by Batisti, Filippo
STUDIA SEMIOTYCZNE, t. XXXI, nr 2 (2017), s. 201–226
ISSN 0137-6608
doi: 10.26333/sts.xxxi2.10 
Rozprawa
FILIPPO BATISTI*
LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY AND ITS RELATION 
TO ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
SUMMARY: The history of so-called ‘linguistic relativity’ is an odd and multi-
faceted one. After knowing alternate fortunes and being treated by different 
academic branches, today there are some new ways of investigating the lan-
guage-thought-reality problem that (i) put into dialogue the latest trends in lan-
guage-related disciplines (ii) generate room for philosophical themes previously 
overlooked, (iii) reassess the very idea of linguistic relativity, despite its popular-
ized versions which have circulated for decades and which have led an otherwise 
fruitful debate to extremes. It is argued that a multidisciplinary approach is de-
sirable in order to broaden future research. In the last few years the opportuni-
ty to study this matter following a common trend in several disciplines has been 
created. Language, and cognition too, are now conceived as intrinsically social 
phenomena. It is argued that relativistic effects should be investigated in so-
cial realms, and that analytic philosophy could help with this task.
KE Y W O R D S: linguistic relativity; Sapir-Whorf hypothesis; Philosophy of lan-
guage; psycholinguistics; extended mind
INTRODUCTION1
This paper will address a single line of research within the many 
ways in which the language-thought relationship has been studied, 
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namely the so-called linguistic relativity principle (LR), also known as 
the ‘Sapir-Whorf hypothesis’.2 Let us define this idea in an expanded 
fashion:
Linguistic relativity is the idea in accordance to which speakers of different specific 
varieties of natural languages, which differ in a number of respects studied by lin-
guistics (such as phonetics, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics), could experience3 
the same objects and activities of the world (such as, but not limited to, physical 
objects perception, colour perception, space relationships, discourse interaction, 
calculus, shaping of categories, decision making) in different ways, on the grounds 
of that very linguistic diversity – and not because of other factors such as explicit 
cultural elaboration, or cognitive deficiencies or deviations.
More concisely, speakers of two languages that do not have similar 
linguistic structures in an identified respect could be affected by this 
asymmetry in the way they think of or experience that respect. As (1) 
shows, there is a wide variety in the domains supposedly interested by 
such LR effects.
But how many kinds of linguistic relativity exist? A very common 
historiographic solution is to pair a ‘strong’ and a ‘weak’ hypothesis. 
The former is used as a synonym for a more transparent ‘linguistic 
determinism’, i.e., the conceptual system of a certain language is in-
commensurable to the others. Lakoff, among others, has analysed the 
“commensurability issue” in its composite meanings, with the result 
of highlighting that “there are several kinds of commensurability, 
2 This label, albeit popular, should be dispreferred because, as Lee (1996) 
stated, there is simply no such thing as a “hypothesis”, formulated by Sapir 
or Whorf, let alone jointly. In Whorf ’s words, LR was a “principle”, therefore 
a “conviction” (Dor 2015, p. 89–90). See also Everett (2013, p. 2), who notes 
that as contemporary research is in fact rapidly evolving, it is probably pointless 
to label the “hypothesis” as belonging to one or another scholar. Furthermore, 
it is worth underscoring that present studies in linguistic relativity are inspired 
by Whorf ’s work only in a broad sense. Criticism on Whorf ’s own positions 
does not automatically affect present-day researchers’ claims, and vice versa (ibid. 
p. 22).
3 Even if the word “experience” surely rings a phenomenological bell, the 
intent was to cover a vast number of aspects of human life (see infra) with one 
single term. It also takes into account Dor’s (2015) complex proposal on consid-
ering language as a communication technology that constantly tries to overcome 
the experiential gap between individuals. This framework challenges a lot of main-
stream assumptions and has implications for LR studies (see ibid., chapter 5) as 
well, but for reasons of space it will not be discussed here.
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and commentators are by no means clear about which kind is being 
discussed” (Lakoff 1987, p. 322). Even so, the ‘weak’ hypothesis – that 
linguistic structures affect in some non-dramatic, temporary, and re-
versible way our cognition – is the one that has caught the interest of 
scholars, especially in cognitive psychology.
However, more recent and in-depth definitions, such as Wolff and 
Holmes’s, seem more useful in order to understand more clearly what 
we are referring to when we speak of linguistic relativity. LR is defined 
as a “‘family’ of related proposals that do not necessarily fall along 
a single strong-to-weak continuum” (Wolff, Holmes 2011, p. 253). 
The authors sketch a tree-diagram in which linguistic determinism 
(the ‘strong hypothesis’) has a premise that thought is indeed separate 
from language (i.e. language is not language-of-thought, in a Fodorian 
fashion), but nonetheless thought and language are considered to 
have parallel structures. From this assumption follows the incom-
mensurability thesis discussed above. Thus, the contrary assumption, 
namely that thought and language differ structurally, corresponds to 
the ‘weak hypothesis’. However, in Wolff and Holmes’s account, this is 
not sufficient to single out the whole spectrum of specific manners in 
which language can affect thought: another seven classes and subclass-
es are individuated by the authors. That is to say, ‘weak hypothesis’ is 
too broad a label for scholarly purposes, albeit useful for differentiat-
ing that sub-family of hypotheses from the deterministic one. In fact, 
the strong v. weak account may have gained ground because it does not 
force the proponents of the ‘weak’ one to defend themselves from all 
the perilous ethical, and epistemological issues connected with the de-
terministic view.4
This paper aims to shed light on the relationship between philos-
ophy and the study of LR in the last two centuries or so, especially 
analysing the last few years in which the whole branch has gained new 
vitality in its aims and methods, also – I argue – thanks to analytic phi-
losophy. I mean to do so by a brief overview of the most interesting 
paths recently taken by scholars.
4 See Lakoff 1987, p. 304 ff.
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1.1 THEORETICAL PREMISE
Before engaging in sketching a history of the treatment of this line of 
work, I wish to explain the criteria upon which the following partition 
has been organised. As a premise, I need to state that I follow the 
opinion that language sciences, and philosophy of language as well, 
should try to treat their object of inquiry not as something abstract 
from its actual use in everyday contexts. Hypostatizing certain features 
of the linguistic structure may have the countereffect of making us 
stray from the ultimate scope of investigating language itself, namely 
to understand how and why humans use it. The concrete patterns 
of interaction – and of action in solitude as well, even if language 
arguably originated as a tool of communication (Tartabini 2011; contra 
Humboldt, see Koerner 2000, p. 10) – should be the starting point of 
an enquiry into its functioning, as well as its arrival point. Certainly, 
conceptual analysis and theoretical knowledge require some degree 
of abstraction, but, especially in psycholinguistic research, the output 
of scholarly elaboration should, eventually, describe the state of affairs 
without overlooking any of the actual situations in which language is 
used by (and among) individuals.
2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY
APPRO-
XIMATE 
DATE
REPRESENTA-
TIVE SCHO-
LARS
RL EXISTS 
/ RELE-
VANT
RL AFFECTS 
ACTUAL BE-
HAVIOUR / 
ACTION
PHILOSO-
PHICAL 
INFLUEN-
CES
1st WAVE 18–19th cent. Hamann, Herder, 
Humboldt
Yes Yes Romantic 
Philosophy
1890s–1950s Boas, Sapir, 
Whorf
Yes Yes (Theosophism 
– Whorfa)
2nd WAVE 1960s–1980s Berlin, Kay, 
Rosch, Penn
No No /
1990s–2000s Lucy, Levinson, 
Slobin, Boroditsky
(Mostly) Yes Mixed /
3rd WAVE 2000s … Michael, Enfield, 
Sidnell, Zinken
Yes Yes Analytic 
Philosophy
a See Whorf 2012, p. 23–25.
Figure 1.
LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY AND ITS RELATION… 205
Figure 1 summarises the criteria through which I look at the history 
of LR: first, a small number of representative scholars from each wave 
or sub-wave have been chosen; then it was noted if they supported 
the existence (and relevance) of LR. Thirdly, it was assessed if their 
approach was consistent with the idea that RL effects affect speakers in 
their everyday life and not only in artificial settings. Finally, the broad 
philosophical influences for each (sub-)wave were indicated. Let us 
now examine in greater detail each one of them.
2.1 THE 1ST WAVE: THE ORIGINS
The relationship between language and thought, broadly construed, 
has been a topic of philosophical elaboration since the Presocratics. 
Even the Bible offers much food for thought in this respect – just 
think of the myth of Tower of Babel. However, this particular line 
of study, namely the influence that each different language may have 
on thought sparked at a particular time. According to Dor (2015, p. 
87–88), four historical and ideological factors decisively contributed to 
the outbreak of interest in such an approach:
First, the rise of the nation-state as a political model, with its romantic ideology 
of nationalism […] brought along a vested interest in a view of language as both 
an exact reflection of the national spirit, the Volksgeist, and a major determining 
factor in its construction.
Secondly:
Europeans, in the course of the project of colonialism, discovered more and more 
languages around the world that were ostensibly very different from the langu-
ages known to them at the time. Travelers, adventurers, and priests began to 
describe and analyze these languages, and suggest ideas as to the relationships 
between them and the cultures within which they emerged.
Thirdly:
secularization: the question of linguistic relativity in its modern form could only begin 
to emerge with the weakening of the conviction that both human language and hu-
man thought, whichever way one thinks about them, are the divine creation of God.
And finally:
Kant’s philosophy of mind, was decidedly universalistic – the categories and intu-
itions are shared by all rational minds – but it immediately opened the door for 
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a relativistic re-formulation: what if we look at the world through the categorical 
lenses of our different languages?
Within this ideological environment, 19th century German scientist 
and intellectual Humboldt was the most eminent voice to offer some 
in-depth insights into the relationship between natural languages and 
the way in which one sees the world (Weltansicht). Humboldt wrote 
that “the world in which we live […] is exactly that into which the 
language we speak transplants us” (Humboldt 1904, p. 332), meaning 
that every language brings a world-view that, mostly unconsciously, 
“mirrors” the way in which language categories “construct the world” 
(see Koerner 2000, p. 10). Again, language is seen as something that 
strongly mediates the external world and the subject that afterwards 
gets to perceive it:
[...] there resides in every language a characteristic world-view. As the individual 
sound stands between man and the object, so the entire language steps in between 
him and the nature that operates, both inwardly and outwardly, upon him [...] 
Man lives primarily with objects, indeed, since feeling and acting in him depend 
on his presentations, he actually does so exclusively, as language presents them to 
him. (Humboldt 1988, p. 6)
As Koerner has accurately shown, there exists a line of thought that 
unites German philosophers (Hamann, Herder, and Humboldt) and 
linguists and anthropologists based in North America (Boas, Sapir, 
and Whorf). Oddly enough, each one of these scholars had been the 
teacher of the next in line – or at least the two had been in contact for 
academic reasons. Sapir was the first, in 1924, to use the term ‘rela-
tivity’ to name the ‘linguistic relativity hypothesis’ as it was popular-
ized by Whorf ’s papers, which also took advantage of the analogy with 
Einstein’s theory of relativity5 in physics.6
However, in the historical partition that I am trying to sketch, the 
German–North American circulation stage of LR still falls in the first 
of the three waves. This is due to the circumstance that the actual im-
plications of linguistic diversity were described in terms of “action”, 
5 This claim is consistent with the one made in footnote 1, as speaking of a “Sa-
pir-Whorf Hypothesis” entails many factors that are not necessarily true, e.g., that 
the two had the same view on the matter.
6 See Zinken (2008) for a repertoire of the various metaphors used in the 
language-thought debate.
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“behaviour” and “habits” – which are mostly alien to the second 
phase of the debate. But first let me clarify what Whorf, as the most 
prominent representative of the first phase, meant with the aforemen-
tioned notions. He wrote:
[the grammar] of each language is [...] itself a shaper of ideas, the program and 
guide for the individual’s mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his 
synthesis of his mental stock in trade. (Whorf 2012, p. 272)
Further, he adumbrated a definition of
a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same 
physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic back-
grounds are similar [...]. (ibid., p. 274)
Language helps us “organize” the world as we perceive it, and 
then, on the basis of this mental organization, we get an already (at 
some level) elaborated blueprint for making decisions and acting. As 
Whorf clarified, he did not “wish to imply that language is the sole or 
even the leading factor in the types of behaviour mentioned [...] but 
that this is simply a coordinate factor along with others” (Lee 1996, 
p. 153). The point I want to make clear is that, in Whorf ’s view, lan-
guage-driven perception is something that is linked in a causal chain 
to behaviour, that is, to action.
2.2 THE 2ND WAVE: CHOMSKIANISM AND 
THE WHORFIAN RENAISSANCE
This last link in the chain had been missing in the LR debate from, 
grosso modo, Whorf ’s posthumous publications in the 1950s until the 
last decade. So, phase two began as a consequence of the renovated 
milieu in psycholinguistic research due to the hegemony gained by 
Chomsky’s Universal Grammar theory. Universalist interpretations of 
the language-thought problem were generally preferred over relativ-
istic ones (Berlin, Kay 1969, Rosch 1972). Meanwhile, experimental 
cognitive psychology procedures and techniques were improved and 
fine-tuned, so that perceptual domains, conceptualisation or orienting 
in space were the dominant themes in LR research. Such a trend had 
the effect of lowering interest in the cognitive consequences of lin-
guistic diversity, because if it was nothing but a superficial phenom-
enon and there existed a cognitive unity of mankind, then LR ought 
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to be false or, in the best case, irrelevant (see Penn 1972, p. I or Pinker 
1994, p. 57). 
One of the champions of the Chomskian standpoint on the 
Whorfian hypothesis is former Boston MIT and now Stanford 
cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker. Pinker is well known not only 
in academic circles and in his books The Language Instinct (1994) and 
The Stuff of Thought (2007) he criticised in neither uncertain nor diplo-
matic terms Whorf ’s arguments and the idea of LR in general, which 
were, according to him, “wrong, all wrong” (Pinker 1994, p. 54). The 
problem with Pinker’s criticism is that, in both books (i.e. even after 
a remarkable thirteen-year interval), he seems to obstinately equate 
linguistic relativity (as well as Whorf ’s hypotheses) with what should 
be properly called linguistic determinism (see supra). Linguist and an-
thropologist Pharao Hansen (2009) has noted that attacking the de-
terministic version of the issue most surely falls into the so-called straw 
man fallacy: since there is a consolidated and widespread consensus 
in psychology about the fact that language is nothing but one of the 
many factors contributing to the formation of thought, consequent-
ly linguistic determinism has long been removed from every serious 
research agenda, due to the untenability of the argument. So, arguing 
against a thesis that is not actually supported by anyone in academia 
and, on the other hand, misrepresenting the neo-Whorfian (see infra) 
has little use.
Apart from the specific case of Pinker’s production, it remains true 
that for many years cognitive scientists and linguists have followed 
the innativist paradigm endorsed by Chomsky. Its non-relativistic 
basic assumption was that crosslinguistic variation should be treated 
as a “surface-level” feature. In Levinson’s words, works such as Berlin 
and Kay’s (1969) on colours wanted to demonstrate that “universals, 
or more exactly typological constraints, may lie behind the apparent 
semantic diversity of languages”. The rejection of the relativity 
argument, then, was rooted in Chomsky’s “conception of language 
as an autonomous formal system” (Dor 2015, p. 90), combined with 
the (Fodorian) thesis that “language and thought, so conceived, are 
separate modules, each with its own essence” (ibid.). In general, thus, 
it was assumed that taking seriously data which conveyed linguistic 
diversity was not as important and meaningful a task as concentrating 
on retrieving the common deep features that must have associated all 
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known languages.7 Therefore, theoretical research in LR had suffered 
a “decades-long delay” before a number of previous proponents of 
Universal Grammar “became complete[ly] disenchanted” with such 
a universalist linguistic paradigm (see Everett 2013, p. 21).
So, in the early 1990s LR received new attention thanks to the 
seminal work by Lucy (1992b) and Gumperz, Levinson (1996) who rep-
resented a different stream in LR research, as they confirmed LR effects 
(e.g. Boroditsky 2001, on time and space, or Imai, Mazuka 2003, on 
objects and substances; Levinson 2003, on spatial frames of reference; 
see Casasanto 2008, 2016 and Everett 2013 for an overview).8 
Slobin’s proposal of “thinking for speaking” is an important one, 
but has a different history, since it refers to “online” effects. More 
clearly, Slobin (1996) holds that the words of the language we are using 
in a specific situation influence our cognition only as long as we use 
them, so that their constraints cease to be effective when the speaker 
stops talking. This kind of effect of language on thought is generally 
not considered a good representative of the relativity principle, since 
“offline” influences – i.e. when linguistic structures affect cognition 
even when speakers are not engaged in language-related tasks – would 
be less expected and much more interesting.
This whole movement has been tagged as “Neo-Whorfian” or as 
a “Whorfian Renaissance”, but these names need clarification: virtually 
all work done under these labels is not strictly related to Whorf ’s, even 
though it is obviously inspired by his writings. As Everett (2013, p. 22) 
puts it, “[neo-Whorfian research] is very non-Whorfian methodologi-
cally”, as Whorf ’s program does not meet the present standards in 
psycholinguistic research, so it is probably safer to use a more neutral 
label like ‘linguistic relativity’.
Multiple perspectives were adopted in relation to a range of onto-
logical domains, though “mostly nonsocial”, as linguistic anthropolo-
gist Enfield points out:
7 For example, Bloom and Keil (2001) offered an alternative explanation to 
Lucy’s (1992a) empirical data bringing into play the causal role of culture, instead 
of language.
8 Lakoff ’s chapter (1987, p. 304–337) on relativism too had helped to re-eval-
uate Whorf ’s ideas, paving the way for the “Rethinking Linguistic Relativity” con-
ference held in Jamaica in 1991, which in turn led to the essential volume edited 
by Gumperz and Levinson (1996).
FILIPPO BATISTI210
research that has been done [...] has covered only a thin slice of the possible scope 
of this topic because Neo-Whorfian work has been fairly consistent in its narrow 
interpretation of the three key concepts. Reality has been taken to mean the realm of 
objective, nonsocial facts: “concepts of ‘time,’ ‘space,’ and ‘matter’”. Thought or mind 
has been taken to mean general, nonsocial cognition: forms of categorization, reaso-
ning, and memory about reality as perceived. And language has mostly been taken 
to refer to structural and semantic features, synchronically framed, with a focus on 
the referential functions of words […] Restricting the scope in this way has delivered 
valuable progress. But it is time to consider the larger space of things that could or 
should be regarded as instances of linguistic relativity. (Enfield 2015, p. 213)
Enfield has indeed good reasons to claim that the majority of 
research has gone in a certain direction, even if he slightly exagger-
ates the actual state of affairs. It is true, as pointed out in detail by 
Björk (2008), that in many experiments artificial settings have been 
employed and that the methodology is certainly “non-social”; at the 
same time, a different approach to the problem has not been absent, 
even since Gumperz, Levinson (1996, part IV where discourse-based 
approaches are considered). Moreover, volumes like Grammars of Space, 
edited by Levinson and Wilkins (2006), consider the semantic param-
eters involved in ‘Where-’ questions: many languages were taken into 
account and all the studies were based on fieldwork – such a method-
ology excluded, e.g., laboratory experiments. But, more important-
ly, its companion volume Space in Language and Cognition (Levinson 
2003), where the linguistic data meet the study of crosslinguistic 
cognitive diversity, shows that relativity effects appear in everyday sit-
uations (see, for example, p. 216–244).
2.3 THE 3RD WAVE: THE EXPANSION PHASE
The last quotation by Enfield could be a starting point for a new gen-
eration of LR researchers as it represents the third phase; I propose 
to call it the ‘expansion phase’. This choice of words is justified by 
a common trend shared by recent developments in many different 
disciplines, namely, the extension of their object of inquiry. This is 
happening in branches such as philosophy of mind, the so-called 4E-
cognition in psychology, linguistic anthropology, linguistic pragmatics, 
and conversation analysis.
More precisely, the focus of their investigation is shifting from the 
individual, taken “in isolation”, to the individual as an agent who 
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interacts with the environment she happens to inhabit; namely, when 
she deals both with other people, and with the so-called cognitive 
artefacts, that is, the artificial devices that affect human cognition 
(Norman 1993, Clark 2003, Heersmink 2013).
All the approaches of that kind seem to fit well with the theoreti-
cal concerns expressed supra (section 1.1). In order not to overlook 
the actual linguistic practices we are normally engaged in while doing 
research, it is useful to conceive language as a tool that primarily exists 
for communicating with other humans (Enfield 2010) and only sec-
ondarily for self-improving one’s cognitive operations (Everett 2012). 
Consequently, a new wave in LR studies could find fruitful suggestions 
and notions apt to pursue the aforementioned goals. Let us see how.
4E-cognition relies on the assumption that every thought process is 
not entirely abstract, but is grounded on contextual axes related to the 
physical bonds on which mental characters are realised (DiFrances-
co, Piredda 2012). Interaction with the environment, then, is a factor 
that contributes to defining the ongoing mental processes. From this 
perspective, among all the factors that affect cognitive processes, the 
first should be our body: in fact, low-level processes, such as percep-
tual and motor ones, seem to be in strict continuity with high-lev-
el ones, such as reasoning and cognition in general (Lupyan, Clark 
2015). So, 4E-cognition employs a situated – and not abstract – notion 
of cognition, which conforms to the faithful picture of psycholinguis-
tic processes sought here.
Linguistic anthropology too has always considered it crucial to 
study language in ordinary, daily contexts (Everett 2012, Lupyan 
2012). Since language is intrinsically social (Enfield 2010), it seems 
clear that this proposition supports the notion of distributed cognition 
(Michael 2002), which serves as a trait d’union between research on 
the functioning of thought and on the nature of language. In this 
last vein, conversation analysis (Sidnell, Enfield 2012, Enfield, Sidnell 
2015) falls within those approaches in philosophy of language and 
language sciences which study ordinary language and all its possible 
functions. The aim is not to lose the dynamic features which define 
the actual use of language.
Now my point should be clearer: there are new domains in which 
LR effects should be looked for. Nonetheless, LR researchers should 
be informed of the latest trends in all these disciplines which share 
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their core interests: language, cognition, what kind of relationship 
links these two elements of human life, and how speaking two different 
languages can affect this relationship.
This point is not that original per se but, in fact, previous attempts 
(see Enfield 2015, p. 214) apparently have not been adequately 
followed up by scholars – philosophers in particular. This new frame 
for research on LR should bring into play a plurality of disciplines. 
This is not a simple purpose and, it may seem rather more perilous 
than promising. Nonetheless, I argue that it is the matter involved 
itself that demands such a complex approach, without which our un-
derstanding of the language-thought problem is bound to remain in-
complete. My further claim is that philosophy needs to regain a role 
in this expansion phase.
3. PHILOSOPHY IN PAST AND PRESENT LR RESEARCH
3.1. NEW PATHS IN RESEARCH
Let me illustrate a few examples of (future) LR research that could 
benefit from a philosophical contribution. Michael’s attempt to re-
formulate LR may be a starting point: his is an example of empiric 
research that goes beyond the cognitivist paradigm, thanks to two 
“theoretical shifts”:
first, from a concern with grammar to a concern with discourse in the context of 
face-to-face interaction; and second, from individual, isolated cognition, to so-
cially-distributed cognition among a group of individuals. (Michael 2002, p. 108)
This new paradigm unwraps many challenges. First, it is recog-
nized that, so far, the conversational approach to culture has been 
tied to an individualist model of cognition – which should be inte-
grated. Andy Clark’s Extended Mind model (Clark, Chalmers 1998) 
fulfils this prescription, as it posits that, in Michael’s words, cognition 
is “rarely, if ever, a process bounded by the skull” and “involves inter-
action with other individuals, and with semiotic artefacts such as texts 
and maps” (ibid.).
Indeed, according to Clark and others, humans inhabit a language-
permeated environment (Clark 2003, Steffensen 2009, Enfield 2010). 
This has consequences for their epistemic access to the world, if we 
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acknowledge that cognitive artefacts play a critical role in enhancing 
cognition (Heersmink 2016, p. 78) and that language is “in many ways 
the ultimate artefact” (Clark 1997, p. 218). If we accept that, then 
language emerges as “central” for human cognition (Lupyan 2016), 
both for the high-level processes of abstract prediction and for the per-
ceptual level, which is “cognitively penetrable” (Lupyan, Clark 2015).
It is clear that LR studies need to redefine the role of cognition in 
the light of this different paradigm. Should we look for LR effects in 
distributed cognition situations? The answer is yes. This kind of col-
lective cognitive process will, to some extent, depend on the features 
of the means allowing such a communicative act. Therefore, the lin-
guistic features of cognitive artefacts could be relevant: different 
languages may have different feedbacks from the artefacts involved, 
depending on the quality of linguistic diversity between the two, thus 
generating LR effects.
Following Michael’s suggestions on the linguistic side of the 
problem, linguistic interaction should represent the basic scenario 
in which LR has to be studied. Scholars belonging to the first two 
waves were mostly concerned with grammatical structures (e.g. Lucy 
1992) and tended to ignore the multiple ways in which they could 
have been used in linguistic interaction (see supra for a few exceptions). 
Language has many more functions than the referential one, which 
for many (contingent) reasons has been privileged (Enfield 2015, 
p. 215). This trend had the result of hiding one of its fundamental 
traits: language is a social tool for action, as well as for communica-
tion and for cognition. The distributed approach to cognition, then, 
seems a promising frame in which to investigate the nature of human 
language. Language turns out to be no longer an isolated or individ-
ual tool, but a situated and intrinsically social one, given that “human 
sociality is at the heart of language” (Enfield 2010). In conclusion, 
experimental research whose subjects are abstracted from “real-life 
contexts” (ibid.) in which everyday social action happens cannot claim 
to be depicting the actual state of affairs.9
For example, it has been shown that in situated social interaction, 
different languages may have different effects on the kinds of social 
9 See Björk (2008) for a detailed elaboration on LR empiric research and its 
“segregation” from real-life contexts.
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actions that can be achieved, thanks to their different linguistic and 
pragmatic paths to construct the conversational schema. Here, rela-
tivity is about “the different rights and duties that speech acts […] 
can give you. [...] Language-specific side-effects on normative obli-
gations in a next conversational move arise because of the unavoid-
able introduction of collateral effects when communicative tools have 
multiple functional features” (Enfield 2015, p. 218). Speakers of 
different languages are thus lead “to linguistically relative collateral 
effects, which lead in turn to differences in our very possibilities for 
social agency” (Sidnell, Enfield 2012, p. 320–321).
Crosslinguistic differences may have dramatic relevance in domains 
such as heuristics because decision making is often a less rational process 
than we may think (Gigerenzer et al. 2011). Since it must be efficient 
and quick, we rely on simple cues to take decisions, and language 
sometimes plays a role in this task, since “concepts are sieves” (Enfield 
2015, p. 210) that filter what is brought to our attention. In fact, cat-
egorisation is one of the most powerful and frequently exploited 
functions of language. Categorisation is the means through which the 
concepts which are the basic units of many everyday actions are built 
up (Clark 1998, Diodato 2015, Enfield 2015).
Before I address in detail these new possibilities of interaction 
between philosophy and LR studies, let me first discuss analytic phi-
losophy.
3.2 LANGUAGE AND REALITY IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
To be fair, the very notion of analytic philosophy has not a single 
univocal nor a universally accepted definition. Or, at least, even lengthy 
attempts at finding strict criteria to define it have somewhat failed 
(Glock 2008; see Marconi 2014, sec. II). According to Glock, some 
of the features of a typical analytic philosopher are the willingness 
to answer substantive questions rather than historical ones following 
“universally applicable standards of rationality”; the clarity and rigour 
of the argumentation (Beckermann 2004, p. 12); adhesion to the lin-
guistic turn; rejection of speculative metaphysics10; just to name a few.
10 It must be said, however, that since the second half of the 20th century, 
analytic philosophers have expanded their area of interest into other branches of 
philosophy, including metaphysics. Simons (2013, p. 709) states that the analytic 
LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY AND ITS RELATION… 215
Defining the pure essence of analytic philosophy is clearly too vast 
a task for the present scope, if possible at all.11 However, even if we 
restrict the area under examination, the analytic tradition shows some 
heterogeneity: different opinions coexist within the same philosophi-
cal area, of course. In fact, analytic philosophy is perhaps best defined 
by appealing to methodological features rather than to some sort of 
list of common beliefs. It is here argued that among the whole analytic 
area there is a line of externalist approaches to language and mind 
that is relevant in LR studies.
Returning to the relation with LR, there is a rich tradition of ex-
ternalist approaches to meaning and mind in analytic philosophy 
that must be mentioned as an interesting source of inspiration for the 
empirical study of how languages affect cognition. 
In his later philosophy Wittgenstein (2009) was concerned about 
the consequences of an internalist approach to thought. For example, 
in §52 of the Big Typescript Wittgenstein (2005) branded as “most 
dangerous” the idea of “thinking as a process in the head, in that 
completely closed-off space”; such a sentiment was confirmed by his 
well-known arguments against, respectively, private language and 
rule-following.12 Putnam’s renowned Twin Earth mental experiment 
maintained that in some cases (namely, natural kind terms, indexi-
cals, and proper names) in order to determine the meaning and the 
reference of such terms definite descriptions or appeals to the subject’s 
internal states are not sufficient, thus postulating the causal role of 
external factors. Burge took Putnam’s intuition even further, claiming 
that the (at least partial) external determination of the semantic 
content applies to virtually every other part of language, i.e. not only 
to natural kind terms etc. In fact, in Burge’s account, the relevant 
anti-metaphysicism was not even the case at the beginnings of this tradition: 
“Among those with an outdated or partial conception of analytic philosophy, 
the whole movement is associated with the rejection of metaphysics. But such 
rejection, however motivated and justified, was never the sole prerogative of 
analytic philosophy, nor was it ever the majority view within that movement”. In 
fact, “it was only during the “middle period” of the 1930s–1950s that, under the 
influence of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy, metaphysics was 
first rejected and later marginalized.”
11 In Pietarinen’s words, “Such a task will invariably be frustrating” (Pietarinen 
2009).
12 See Wittgenstein (2009) §258–271 and §143–155.
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factors in determining the semantic content of certain intentional 
states are to be retrieved in the linguistic conventions, norms or rules 
of the given linguistic community.13 Moreover, Davidson had defended 
a peculiar form of externalism of the mind, while rejecting Wittgen-
stein’s, Putnam’s and Burge’s, even though he swung between a phys-
icalist and a social version of externalism (De Caro 2011, p. 181 ff.). 
Finally, Quine’s ontological relativity thesis, based on the famous 
radical translation argument, bears a clear resonance with LR. None-
theless, Quine has never explicitly confronted himself with Whorf ’s 
work, except for a very brief mention14 by which we understand that – 
as was common at the time – he gave a strictly determinist interpreta-
tion of the linguistic relativity principle. Indeed, his thesis that linguis-
tic reference or meaning cannot be determined outside the context of 
a given language (ontological relativity), thus leaving us with the un-
resolved question of what even the words of our language ultimately 
refer to,15 can be related to a form of linguistic determinism. However, 
it is difficult to say if Quine would have fully endorsed Whorf ’s view 
that every culture “carries with it an implicit metaphysics, a model 
of the universe, composed of notions and assumptions organized 
into a harmonious system” (Whorf 2012, p. 361), as he argued for an 
“implicit metaphysics”, nestled “in the very structure and grammar” 
of a given language, “as well as being observable in […] culture and 
behavior” (ibid., p. 75). There are linguists – more precisely, semanti-
cists – who have tried to escape the burden of ontological commitment 
by analysing crosslinguistic structural differences dropping any claim 
whatsoever about the “metaphysical reality” embedded in different 
natural languages. Bach16, for example, developed his Natural 
13 Putnam 1975 and Burge 1979. See also Amoretti (2013, p. 247–263) for an 
overview.
14 Quine 2003, p. 61.
15 It seems that the reference of the word ‘rabbit’ remains indeterminate, 
following Quine (1990, p. 50) where he comments that “‘rabbit’ refers to rabbits, 
whatever they are”, which follows from the assumption that there is no natural-
istic “matter of fact” as to what either “gavagai” or “rabbit” refer to. Davidson 
(1989) replied to this kind of aporiai deconstructing the “myth of the subjec-
tive”: according to him, the (somehow quinean) idea that conceptual schemas are 
immanent to different natural languages or scientific theories is wrong. See Pavan, 
Sgaravatti (2015) for an overview.
16 Bach 1986, Bach, Chao 2012. See also Pellettier 2011.
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Language Metaphysics as a programme which wanted to answer the 
question “What do people talk as if there is?”, as opposed to the “fun-
damental question of metaphysics ‘What is there?’” (Bach, Chao 2012, 
p. 175). Bach professed modesty:
Is there a natural language metaphysics? How could there not be? One of our 
main resources for coming to understand the world is, after all, language, a sort 
of tool box for doing whatever it is we want to do. Do the fundamental distinctions 
that are reflected in the overt and covert categories of natural language corre-
spond in any way to the structure of the world? How could they not? But this is 
where linguistics stops. (Bach 1986, p. 597)
Further, he stated that it was “immoral” of a linguist to make claims 
whether grammatical objects corresponded to “real things in the world, 
perceptual or conceptual categories that are independent of language, 
or to nothing at all” (ibid., p. 592). Is this too pretentious an endeavour 
for philosophers as well? One way or another, empirical studies on LR 
will hopefully help address the dilemma. Please note that, in this funda-
mental respect, empirical cognitive research is crucially different from 
Wierzbicka and Goddard’s Natural Semantic Metalanguage proposal. 
The authors, representing a vast number of field linguists, held that it 
is possible to empirically compile a metalanguage out of the “semantic 
primitives”, i.e. “undecomposable meanings” which were eventual-
ly shared by a high number of diverse natural languages. They also 
maintained that “the simple propositions which can be expressed 
through the NSMs based on different languages will be fundamental-
ly isomorphic.”17 In other words, according to the Natural Semantic 
Metalanguage programme, virtually all human languages (therefore 
all human cultures, and therefore all human beings) share a core set 
of semantic primitives, forming the common conceptual foundation of 
all cultures. However, this universalistic programme does not accept 
Bach’s admonition about the danger lurking in inferring too much 
from merely linguistic data.
Still, the role of past philosophical contributions in assessing 
whether different languages affect the cognitive life of speakers 
remains uncertain. Humboldt and the other German romantic phi-
losophers’ interest in linguistics was linked to the idea that the “inner 
17 Goddard 1994, p. 10. See Goddard, Wierzbicka 1995; Pellettier 2011, p. 4–8.
FILIPPO BATISTI218
form” of language of a community was an expression of a people’s 
“national mind and unfolding, in line with the Romantic concept of 
history” (Koerner 2000, p. 1). So, perhaps, a (broadly construed) phil-
osophical approach to LR is not helpful in terms of avoiding unsub-
stantiated exaggerations, but on the other hand even linguists are not 
exempt from such a temptation, from time to time. Let us consider, 
for example, this quotation from Goddard: “the comparatively muted 
quality of the English [emotion] words (except for joy, which is the 
least common of them) is consistent with the traditional Anglo-Sax-
on dislike of extreme emotions” (Goddard 1998, p. 94). Even if the 
latter came from a strongly universalist point of view, while the former 
expressed a clear relativistic attitude, the direction the third wave in 
LR studies is taking – and, most importantly, how the conceptual 
and methodological tools of analytic philosophy might be valuable – 
should be clearer.
3.3 A PHILOSOPHICAL STANCE ON A FEW PROBLEMS
Among the notions named so far, some are of obvious philosophi-
cal interest, e.g. ‘cognitive artefact’, which according to Heersmink 
(2016), needs to be better understood from a metaphysical point of 
view, integrating the existing literature in analytic philosophy of tech-
nology. Obviously, this notion is embedded in the Extended Mind 
(EM) paradigm, which has started one of the most interesting recent 
discussions in analytic philosophy of mind. However, without neces-
sarily committing to the EM theory, the idea that language is a tool 
which shapes thoughts instead of merely communicating them has 
wide resonance in psychology (Lupyan 2012, 2016, Borghi et al. 
2013, Gentner 2016), artificial intelligence (Mirolli, Parisi 2009) and, 
of course, philosophy of mind (Dennett 1993, Clark 1998). One 
argument of Vygotskian descent is central to this view:18 the private 
speech of children (which later in development becomes internalized) 
is a symptom of the child experimenting with its capability of re-shap-
ing the tasks and actions that it wants or is required to perform. Cat-
egories that language brings along help the speaker in finding com-
monalities between distinct objects and by such means simplifies and 
18 See Mirolli and Parisi 2009, p. 519–520 and Clark 1998.
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accelerates the (cognitive) action. Thus, language is used as a scaffold 
in augmenting our cognitive skills – in fact self-referred speech 
represent “a significant portion of the child’s linguistic production” 
(Mirolli, Parisi 2009, p. 523). It must be said that existing work on 
this matter concentrates mostly on the role of language in general 
and not on particular languages, i.e. in a crosslinguistic perspective. 
Nevertheless, here it is argued that such a line of research should be 
started. After all, once it is demonstrated that language influences at 
least some aspects of human cognitive life, the next natural step is 
to verify whether, other things being equal, different languages have 
peculiar features in the process of enhancing cognition.
Sidnell and Enfield (2012) considered social interaction as a new 
“locus” for LR (see supra). Within this framework, they note that the 
concept of “action” has received philosophical attention since Aristotle, 
although the most influential contribution in recent times is Austin’s 
(1962), along with its followers, starting with Searle (1969). However, 
this notion needed further revision, at least in the opinion of the 
authors: the Austinian notion of illocutionary act has been judged 
insufficient to properly explain how interaction works, as in such 
a situation, “a person’s primary task is to decide how to respond, not 
to label what someone just did” (Enfield, Sidnell 2017, ii). That this 
kind of philosophical-linguistic analysis may be labelled as “analytic” is 
argued, among others, by Glock (2008, p. 54), also considering Searle’s 
and Grice’s work. It is interesting to consider the authors’ challenge to 
the classical philosophical approach to action:
We suggest that philosophers and others have created a spurious (though both co-
nvenient and intuitive) category of things called actions that are distinct from, and 
causally related to, the specific practices of conduct and modes of inference thro-
ugh which these ‘actions’ are realized in interaction. (Enfield, Sidnell 2017, xii)
They criticize the standard account of the notion of “action”, ques-
tioning the fictitious ontology assumed by scholars (also in conversa-
tion analysis and linguistic anthropology) who have argued that “a list 
or inventory of possible action types” is achievable, in principle, and 
that, therefore, if an individual wants to perform one of them, “they 
merely need to provide adequate cues as to which one of these possible 
actions they mean to be doing” (ibid.). So, further philosophical elabo-
ration is needed if we are to understand how social interaction works, 
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complying with detailed ethnolinguistic data. Thereafter, crosslinguis-
tic differences in social interaction could be better investigated.
Another philosophically relevant notion in analytic ontology 
is “social reality”. According to Searle (2007), social reality is only 
created through language and it can be approached by linguistic 
means alone. In a crosslinguistic perspective, it should be investigat-
ed if different languages create different socio-institutional realities.
As Enfield (2015, p. 216) puts it, “whenever language is used to create 
social reality […] it is never just language but always a language”. 
Notions sensible to crosslinguistic variation would be – among many 
others, including money, property or corporate identity – that of 
“social self ” and that of “accountability” (see also Sidnell 2017). For 
instance, public signs that verbally prohibit such and such behaviours 
may perform this illocutionary act with different nuances depending 
on the language used, generating correspondently different degrees 
of accountability for those who do not obey the prescription (in this 
perspective, multilingual situations would be of great interest).
More generally, the problem of individuality versus collectivity is 
being considered with increasing attention in analytic philosophy, 
from various perspectives. For example, the linguistic component in 
the distribution of agency, considered as an instance of social interaction, 
turned out to be crucial, according to Rossi and Zinken (2017). The 
authors analysed the ways in which Italian and Polish treat imperson-
al deontic declarative statements (such as the English “it is necessary 
to”) and the relation between the grammatical means of bringing 
about a request for cooperation and the interactional negotiation of 
agency (namely, who has to do the required action). Rossi and Zinken 
concluded that “what may at first glance appear only subtle, differ-
ences of expression […] put constraints on what people can or should 
do in a given situation. Moreover, given the great diversity among 
languages, grammatical variation will be consequential also for social 
interaction across cultures” (ibid., p. 85). To conclude, the possibil-
ity that the fact that “the conceptual distinctions made available by 
different languages can differ radically […] implies diversity in the 
kinds of reality that language can create” (Enfield 2015, p. 216) must 
be taken seriously.
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4. CONCLUSION
More than 15 years ago, Michael wrote:
the long-standing controversy over linguistic relativity has been only modestly im-
pacted by two significant developments in our modern understandings of language 
and cognition – namely, the now commonplace position that both language and 
cognition are fundamentally interactional and socially-situated practices that can-
not be reduced to isolated, abstract knowledge structures. (Michael 2002, p. 107)
Unfortunately, little has been done since, either in terms of the 
amount of empirical research following this recent “theoretical shift”, 
or in terms of the number of particular languages taken into consid-
eration (Everett 2013, p. 267). Whatever the reasons, both linguistics 
and philosophy of language have limited themselves to regarding the 
referential function of language as its core function giving a biased 
view of the actual use of language and directing LR research only 
onto specific trails. This trend has been recently inverted, but another 
factor that can positively contribute to this change is a philosophi-
cal analysis of the notions involved in this paradigm shift. Thus, it 
will be possible to give an increasingly more accurate account of how 
language works in real-life contexts. An interdisciplinary approach is 
certainly needed, and analytic philosophy appears to be the most ap-
propriate companion – perhaps not by referring to the arguments 
discussed in the past as much as by appealing to its conceptual tools 
and more recent debates on relevant topics.
In conclusion, let me return to the initial defining issue, and try 
to update the initial definition (1) with an even more lengthy but 
complete modified version:
(2) Linguistic relativity is the idea in accordance to which speakers of different spe-
cific varieties of natural languages, which differ in a number of respects studied by 
linguistics (such as phonetics, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics), could experien-
ce the same objects and activities of the world (such as, but not limited to, physical 
objects perception, colour perception, space relationships, calculus, shaping of 
categories, decision making) in different ways, interacting with the environment 
(including external artefacts or other agents), on grounds of that very linguistic 
diversity – and not because of other factors such as explicit cultural elaboration, or 
cognitive deficiencies or deviations. Moreover, some forms of linguistic relativity 
involve domains that exceed individual experience, such as patterns of language-
-mediated social interaction, or the by-products of social reality, which is created 
and accessible only through language.
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NOTE
Different versions of this paper were presented orally at the 2nd In-
ternational Philosophy Students’ Symposium held at the University of 
Maribor (Slovenia) and at the 5th International Conference on Philos-
ophy of Language and Linguistics (PhiLang 2017) held at the Univer-
sity of Łódź (Poland).
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